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Bruton: The Principles of Judicial Proof or the Process of Proof

BOOK REVIEWS
THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF OR THE PROCESS OF PROOF.
By John Henry Wigmore. Boston, Massachusetts: Little, Brown
and Company. 2d ed. 1931. Pp. xix, 1056.
"There is, and there must be, a probative science-the principles of proof-independent of the artificial rules of procedure;
hence, it can be and should be studied. This science, to be sure,
may as yet be imperfectly formulated. But all the more need
is there to begin in earnest to investigate and develop it."
It
is with this confession of faith that Dean Wigmore embarks upon
the task of expounding the "principles of judicial proof as contained in logic, psychology and general experience and illustrated
in judicial trials." It is apparent that he believes: (1) in the
possibility of developing a system of proof based upon "the natural
processes of the mind in dealing with evidential facts" and (2) in
the necessity of developing such a system if evidence is to be
weighed and understood by the trier of the facts, whether judge
or jury. With the relaxation of our rules of admissibility he feels
that a "scientific" system of proof will save American courts
from the plight which he asserts exists in continental Europe due
to the lack of any science of proof there.
What is the nature of this "science" and how is it to be developed? Dean Wigmore has taken one thousand fifty six pages
to answer this question and a very stimulating answer it is. An
adequate explanation of it cannot be given here but those who
peruse these pages for themselves will agree that the distinguished
author makes out a fair case for the existence of a probative
science. Although he does not propound any "laws" of thought
by which we may test the validity of our conclusions, what he
does propose is a scheme which he suggests will aid the mind in
analyzing and weighing a mixed mass of evidence, not by showing
what conclusion ought to be drawn from a given set of facts, but
by indicating the various conclusions which may be drawn and
the mental processes upon which they are based. In other words,
it is the purpose of this book to make us more conscious of the
processes of thought by which we weigh and appraise evidence.
The general outline of the book remains the same as it was
in the first edition. After a general description of the probative
processes, the subjects of circumstantial evidence, testimonial
evidence and autoptic proference (real evidence) are treated in
order. The arrangement of the subdivisions under each subject
is quite similar to that followed in the author's treatise on evidence.
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The last part of the book consists of a number of cases which are
intended to serve as subject matter for analysis. The first four
parts have been entirely rewritten in text form so as to make a
continuous exposition of the system and in this respect the second
edition is a decided improvement on the first. Numerous charts
are included for the purpose of illustrating the use of the system
as applied to a complicated set of facts but the reviewer must
confess that on first examination they have appeared to him more
confusing than illuminating.
Dean Wigmore is pioneering in a field which has received
entirely too little attention. His book not only should be read
but studied by all those interested in the problem of proof whether
they be practitioners or scholars. However, it is doubtful whether
the work can receive very wide use in the class room. In the hands
of the author it undoubtedly would form the basis of a very valuable course but when used by others it might serve only to present
material which could more profitably be studied in the court
room.
-PAUL

W. BRUTON.

Yale Law School

WHAT PRimE JuRY TRAus. By Irvin Stalmaster. Boston,
Massachusetts. The Stratford Company. 1931. Pp. ii, 143.
In this small volume the author has set out to state a case.
This time it is the jury that is on trial. The verdict sought is
death-the complete abolition of the jury in civil cases. Although,
as the author points out, limitations have been imposed upon the
right to jury trial in a number of states, one is moved to suggest
that his case will out-last that prize litigation, Jarndyce u. Jarrdyce, before the cause is won. The attitude of the legal profession and the inertia of the public mind are obstacles of no small
moment. They stand squarely in his path.
The thesis is developed in simple non-technical language with
the expressed purpose of presentation to all interested minds.
Thus it has what might seem to a lawyer an elementary though
rather refreshing flavor.
Turning to the substance of the argument the reader is likely
to find nothing unusual, certainly so if he has had sufficient interest in the topic in the past to subject it to reflection and discussion. The merit of the book lies in the force of its presenta-
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